Informational Cycles in Search Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mauring, Eeva
• 署名单位: University of Vienna
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180129
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 170-192
• 关键词: transparency; equilibria; volatility; prices

摘要

I show that market participants' equilibrium beliefs can create fluctuations in the volume of trading, even in a stationary environment. I study a sequential search model where buyers face an unknown distribution of offers. Each buyer learns about the distribution by observing whether a randomly chosen buyer traded yesterday. A cyclical equilibrium exists where the informational content of observing a trade fluctuates, which leads to fluctuations in the volume of trading. The cyclical equilibrium is more efficient than steady-state equilibria. The efficiency result holds also if buyers get a signal about past transaction prices or past trading volumes.