Information Transmission under the Shadow of the Future: An Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wilson, Alistair J.; Vespa, Emanuel
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170403
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 75-98
• 关键词: infinitely repeated games; individual play; COOPERATION; deception; EVOLUTION; determinants; strategies; BEHAVIOR; team

摘要

We experimentally examine how information transmission functions in an ongoing relationship. Where the one-shot-cheap-talk literature documents substantial overcommunication and preferences for honesty, the outcomes in our repeated setting are more consistent with uninformative babbling outcomes. This is particularly surprising, as honest revelation is supportable as an equilibrium outcome in our repeated setting. We show that inefficient outcomes are driven by a coordination failure on how to distribute the gains from information sharing. However, when agents can coordinate on the payment of an information rent, honest revelation emerges.