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作者：Schenone, Pablo
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Consider a decision-maker (DM) who must select an alternative from a set of mutually exclusive alternatives but must take this decision sequentially. If the DM's choice correspondence over subsets of alternatives satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP), then the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) and backward induction (BI) strategies coincide. We study the relation between the SPNE and BI strategies when the DM's choice correspondence fails to satisfy WARP. First, Sen's ax...
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作者：Eldar, Ofer; Magnolfi, Lorenzo
作者单位：Duke University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This article develops an empirical model of firms' choice of corporate laws under inertia. Delaware dominates the incorporation market, though recently Nevada, a state whose laws are highly protective of managers, has acquired a sizable market share. Using a database of firm incorporation decisions from 1995 to 2013, we show that most firms dislike protectionist laws, such as anti-takeover statutes and liability protections for officers, and that Nevada's rise is due to the preferences of smal...
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作者：Chang, Jen-Wen
作者单位：California State University System; California State University Fullerton
摘要：An entrepreneur finances her project via crowdfunding. She chooses a funding mechanism (fixed or flexible), a price, and a funding goal. Under fixed funding, money is refunded if the goal is not met; under flexible funding, there is no refund. Backers observe signals about project value and decide whether to contribute or postpone purchase to the retail stage. Using the linkage principle, we show that the optimal campaign uses fixed funding. Furthermore, we show that an entrepreneur who is not...
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作者：Kuvalekar, Aditya; Lipnowski, Elliot
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Columbia University
摘要：We examine the relationship between job security and productivity in a fixed wage worker-firm relationship facing match quality uncertainty. The worker's action affects both learning and current productivity. The firm, seeing worker behavior and outcomes, makes a firing decision. As bad news accrues, the firm cannot commit to retain the worker. This creates perverse incentives: the worker strategically slows learning, harming productivity. We fully characterize the unique equilibrium in our co...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; Lancaster University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a player's beliefs about the opponent's strategy and the actual strategy. Our equilibrium condition requires that (i) each player choose a best-response strategy to his distorted belief about the opponent's strategy, and (ii) the distortion functions form best resp...
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作者：Fan, Ying; Yang, Chenyu
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Rochester
摘要：This paper studies (1) whether, from a welfare point of view, oligopolistic competition leads to too few or too many products in a market, and (2) how a change in competition affects the number and the composition of product offerings. We address these two questions in the context of the US smartphone market. Our findings show that this market contains too few products and that a reduction in competition decreases both the number and variety of products. These results suggest that product choi...
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作者：Dai, Weijia; Luca, Michael
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Harvard University
摘要：Collaborating with Yelp and the City of San Francisco, we revisit a canonical example of quality disclosure by evaluating and helping to redesign the posting of restaurant hygiene scores on Yelp.com . We implement a two-stage intervention that separately identifies consumer response to information disclosure and a disclosure design with improved salience-a consumer alert. We find score posting is effective, but improving salience further increases consumer response.
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作者：Hanany, Eran; Klibano, Peter; Mukerji, Sujoy
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Northwestern University; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We study incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players. Our focus is on equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality-each player's strategy is optimal at each information set given opponents' strategies. We show sequential optimality, which does not make any explicit assumption on updating, is equivalent to sequential optimality with respect to beliefs updated using a particular generalization of Bayesian updating. Ambiguity aversion expands the set of equilibria compatib...
