Revealed Preference Implications of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schenone, Pablo
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180077
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 230-256
• 关键词: Choice functions; COMMITMENT

摘要

Consider a decision-maker (DM) who must select an alternative from a set of mutually exclusive alternatives but must take this decision sequentially. If the DM's choice correspondence over subsets of alternatives satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP), then the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) and backward induction (BI) strategies coincide. We study the relation between the SPNE and BI strategies when the DM's choice correspondence fails to satisfy WARP. First, Sen's axiom a is necessary and sufficient for the set of SPNE strategies to be a subset of the set of BI strategies; moreover, a mild strengthening of Sen's axiom f is necessary and sufficient for the set of BI strategies to be a subset of the set of SPNE strategies. These results extend to multiplayer games.