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作者：Ngangoue, M. Kathleen; Weizsaecker, Georg
作者单位：New York University; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：Our experiments investigate the extent to which traders learn from the price, differentiating between situations where orders are submitted before versus after the price has realized. In simultaneous markets with bids that are conditional on the price, traders neglect the information conveyed by the hypothetical value of the price. In sequential markets where the price is known prior to the bid submission, traders react to price to an extent that is roughly consistent with the benchmark theory...
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作者：Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija; Park, In-Uck
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：We examine a setup where two agents allocate a fixed budget between public goods in two areas. The agents may be biased to one area, which is their private information. Without communication, the funds are allocated inefficiently, resulting in gaps and duplication in public good provision. Direct communication between the agents is ineffective and cannot resolve the coordination failure even when the potential biases are negligible. Coordination can be improved by a mediator who filters the in...
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作者：Tyson, Christopher J.
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We propose the exponential satisficing model of boundedly rational decision-making, a general-purpose tool designed for use in typical microeconomic applications. The model posits that the preferences perceived and acted upon by the agent are a stochastic coarsening of his or her true, welfare-significant preferences. The decision-maker's perceptual capabilities are controlled by a preference resolution parameter, which smoothly varies the impact of cognitive constraints on choice. To demonstr...
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作者：Bochet, Olivier; Siegenthaler, Simon
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：In markets with asymmetric information, where equilibria are often inefficient, bargaining can help promote welfare. We design an experiment to examine the impact of competition and price transparency in such settings. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that competition promotes efficiency if bargainers cannot observe each other's price offers. Contrary to the predictions, however, the efficiency-enhancing effect of competition persists even when offers are observable. We exp...
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作者：Ryan, Nicholas
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：The integration of markets may improve efficiency by lowering costs or reducing local market power. India, seeking to reduce electricity shortages, set up a new power market, in which transmission constraints sharply limit trade between regions. During congested hours, measures of market competitiveness fall and firms raise bid prices. I use confidential bidding data to estimate the costs of power supply and simulate market outcomes with more transmission capacity. Counterfactual simulations s...
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作者：Maniquet, Francois; Neumann, Dirk
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：In a model where agents differ in wages and preferences over labor time-consumption bundles, we study labor income tax schemes that alleviate poverty. To avoid conflict with individual well-being, we require redistribution to take place between agents on both sides of the poverty line provided they have the same labor time. This requirement is combined with efficiency and robustness properties. Maximizing the resulting social preferences under incentive compatibility constraints yields the fol...
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作者：Song, Minjae
作者单位：The Brattle Group
摘要：In two-sided markets, two groups of agents interact through platforms. Because agents' decision to join a platform is affected by the presence of agents on the other side, their interactions create indirect network externalities and make platforms' strategies different from those of firms in one-sided markets. In this paper, I use a structural model to show that platforms may take a loss on one side of the market to make a profit on the other side and that platform mergers may benefit some age...
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作者：Jin, Ginger Zhe; Luca, Michael; Martin, Daniel
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Harvard University; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver ac...
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作者：Bizzotto, Jacopo; Vigier, Adrien
作者单位：Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet); BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：We compare a credit rating agency's incentives to acquire costly information when it is only paid for giving favorable ratings to the corresponding incentives when the agency is paid up-front, i.e., irrespective of the ratings assigned. We show that, in the presence of moral hazard, contingent fees provide stronger dynamic incentives to acquire information than up-front fees and may induce higher social welfare. When the fee structure is chosen by the agency, contingent fees arise as an equili...
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作者：Gans, Joshua S.; Goldfarb, Avi; Lederman, Mara
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty highlights the role of voice when individuals confront an unexpected deterioration in quality. Yet, voice has received little attention. To motivate our empirical analysis, we develop a simple model of voice as the equilibrium of a relational contract between customers and firms. We use data on 4 million tweets to or about US airlines to study the relationship between quality, voice, and market structure. Voice increases when quality deteriorates. This rela...
