Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mace, Antonin; Treibich, Rafael
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); University of Southern Denmark
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180309
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 70-111
• 关键词: decision-rules; limit-theorem

摘要

We study the design of voting rules for committees representing heterogeneous groups (countries, states, districts) when cooperation among groups is voluntary. While efficiency recommends weighting groups proportionally to their stakes, we show that accounting for participation constraints entails overweighting some groups, those for which the incentive to cooperate is the lowest. When collective decisions are not enforceable, cooperation induces more stringent constraints that may require granting veto power to certain groups. In the benchmark case where groups differ only in their population size (i.e., the apportionment problem), the model provides a rationale for setting a minimum representation for smaller groups.