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作者：Mimra, Wanda; Waibel, Christian
作者单位：heSam Universite; ESCP Business School
摘要：This paper provides the first systematic analysis of the role of contracting environments on market outcomes and efficiency in markets with hidden information using experimental methods. When markets are plagued by hidden information, competition does not necessarily ensure efficient market outcomes. This crucially depends on the nature of the hidden information. We present a parsimonious experimental design that serves to compare the different contracting environments for both types of hidden...
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作者：Vohra, Akhil
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; University of Exeter
摘要：Labor markets unravel when workers and firms match inefficiently early under limited information. I argue that a significant determinant of unraveling is the presence of a secondary market, where firms can poach workers, and its transparency: how well firms can ascertain workers' value once they are employed by competitors. While early hiring reduces the probability of hiring a high-type worker, it prevents rivals from learning about the worker, making poaching difficult. When secondary market...
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作者：Camboni, Matteo; Porcellacchia, Michael
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW)
摘要：In a model of moral hazard in teams, we demonstrate that firms'concerns about low trust among teammates can justify two common but otherwise puzzling patterns: information waste and transparency trap. We find firms predominantly employ individual performance bonuses, ignoring that relevant information about team output and competition for better contracts leads workers into a self-defeating race toward effort transparency. Notably, the firm may be indifferent to or benefit from trust concerns,...
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作者：Decarolis, Francesco; Li, Muxin; Paternollo, Filippo
作者单位：Bocconi University; Fudan University; Shanghai Institute for Mathematics & Interdisciplinary Sciences; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper offers the first systematic quantitative assessment of default-option interventions designed to mitigate Google's search dominance. By analyzing interventions in the European Economic Area (EEA), Russia, and Turkey, we find that across all three cases, changes to default settings effectively reduced Google's market share. The causal impact amounts to less than 1 percentage point in the EEA and over 10 percentage points in Russia and Turkey. Differences arise from intervention nuance...
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作者：Corbi, Raphael; Sanches, Fabio Miessi
作者单位：Universidade de Sao Paulo; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We study the effects of church tax exemptions on the structure of religious markets. Using the Brazilian experience as a showcase, we develop and estimate a dynamic entry model of religious organizations based on temple opening and closure in geographically isolated markets. Counterfactual simulations suggest that tax exemptions stimulated entry by all religions, but disproportionately benefited evangelical denominations: The evangelical share of temples increased by approximately 20 percentag...
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作者：Hossain, Tanjim; Morgan, John
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Toronto; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We model decisions to apply for college admission, attend job auditions, or run for C-suite positions as costly entry into meritocracies, where the entrant with the highest ability wins a reward. Ability is privately known and players generically differ in commonly known characteristics such as ability distributions, entry costs, or payoffs from winning. Any infinitesimal difference leads to wildly different equilibrium entry probabilities, explaining large dispersion in representation of comp...
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作者：Vong, Allen
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：A firm trades with a sequence of consumers who are unsure about the firm's competence and its effort to supply quality. I examine rating systems that sustain efficient outcomes in virtually all trades by providing consumers with information to motivate a patient-competent firm's effort. I characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for these systems to exist. I show that any such system censors the firm's track records, and explicitly construct one such system. This system reveals that th...
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作者：Biglaiser, Gary; Gu, Jiadong; Li, Fei
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; Zhejiang University
摘要：We consider the equilibrium interplay between sellers' price competition and consumers' perception of product differentiation. We analyze a situation where, before trading, consumers acquire information at a cost about their preferences between sellers' differentiated products. The incentive for information acquisition depends on the average value of products, the objective product differentiation, and their beliefs about sellers' prices. The acquired information shapes consumers' perceived pr...
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作者：Ganglmair, Bernhard; Simcoe, Timothy; Tarantino, Emanuele
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：Using data from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a voluntary organization that develops protocols for managing internet infrastructure, we estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of the decision to continue or abandon a line of research. The model's key parameters measure the speed at which authors learn whether their project will become a technology standard. We use the model to simulate two innovation policies: an R&D subsidy and a publication prize. While subsidies have a larger...
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作者：Caradonna, Peter; Miller, Nathan h.; Sheu, Gloria
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Georgetown University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：We model merger-induced entry in the context of differentiated-products price competition. We fully characterize the combinations of merger efficiencies and entrant qualities that can mitigate the adverse equilibrium welfare effects of an otherwise anticompetitive merger. The possibility of merger-induced entry introduces nonmonotonicity into the equilibrium value that consumers receive from merger efficiencies, potentially necessitating the joint analysis of efficiencies and entry in merger r...
