Asymmetric Players in a Meritocracy: A Case for Affirmative Action

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hossain, Tanjim; Morgan, John
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of Toronto; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220362
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 454-475
• 关键词: Incomplete information; contests; entry; auctions; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We model decisions to apply for college admission, attend job auditions, or run for C-suite positions as costly entry into meritocracies, where the entrant with the highest ability wins a reward. Ability is privately known and players generically differ in commonly known characteristics such as ability distributions, entry costs, or payoffs from winning. Any infinitesimal difference leads to wildly different equilibrium entry probabilities, explaining large dispersion in representation of comparable but nonidentical population groups. Affirmative action policies such as handicapping advantaged players or surcharging them to subsidize disadvantaged players increase participation rates of disadvantaged players and, in return, increase social welfare. (JEL D82, J15, J16, J22, K31, M51)