Monitoring Team Members: Information Waste and the Transparency Trap

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Camboni, Matteo; Porcellacchia, Michael
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240240
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 324-368
• 关键词: Moral hazard; optimal-contracts; implementation; determinants; incentives

摘要

In a model of moral hazard in teams, we demonstrate that firms'concerns about low trust among teammates can justify two common but otherwise puzzling patterns: information waste and transparency trap. We find firms predominantly employ individual performance bonuses, ignoring that relevant information about team output and competition for better contracts leads workers into a self-defeating race toward effort transparency. Notably, the firm may be indifferent to or benefit from trust concerns, challenging the idea that robustness concerns invariably harm the principal's payoffs. Our analysis highlights a novel trade-off between the classical information rents and strategic insurance rents emerging from trust concerns. (JEL D21, D82, D86, J33, M54)