作者：Oechssler, J
摘要：A convincing interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria describes them as steady states in a large population in which players use pure strategies but the population as a whole mimics a mixed strategy. I study the conditions under which an evolutionary, stochastic learning process converges to the appropriate distribution over pure strategies in the population. I find that not all mixed equilibria can be justified as the result of an evolutionary process even if the equilibrium is unique. For...
作者：Somanathan, E
摘要：Sufficient conditions for pure-strategy Nash equilibria of finite games to be (Lyapunov) stable under a large class of evolutionary dynamics, the regular monotonic selection dynamics, are discussed. In particular, it is shown that in almost all finite extensive-form games, all the pure-strategy equilibria are stable. In such games, all mixed-strategy equilibria close to pure-strategy equilibria are also stable. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
作者：Gromb, D; Ponssard, JP; Sevy, D
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); Orange SA; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：This paper proposes a game theoretic framework to study dynamic competition with entry deterrence. Sufficient conditions are given such that the competition process results in the most efficient firm being eventually selected. We show this selection property for asymmetric firms to be the natural economic extension to the rent dissipation property obtained for symmetric firms. This framework is used to discuss previous models in which the selection property had not been studied (dynamic limit ...
