Selection in dynamic entry games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Gromb, D; Ponssard, JP; Sevy, D
署名单位：
Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); Orange SA; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1997.0571
发表日期：
1997
页码：
62-84
关键词：
摘要：
This paper proposes a game theoretic framework to study dynamic competition with entry deterrence. Sufficient conditions are given such that the competition process results in the most efficient firm being eventually selected. We show this selection property for asymmetric firms to be the natural economic extension to the rent dissipation property obtained for symmetric firms. This framework is used to discuss previous models in which the selection property had not been studied (dynamic limit pricing and capacity renewal) or may fail to hold (quantity competition). (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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