1-2期

最新文章

• Special issue: Robert J. Aumann, part 2 AI翻译
  作者：[Anonymous]
• Iterated expectations and common priors AI翻译
  作者：Samet, D
  作者单位：Tel Aviv University
  摘要：A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior for several players is given in terms of the players' present belief; only. A common prior exists iff for each random variable it is common knowledge that all its iterated expectations converge to the same value; this value is its expectation with respect to the common prior. The proof is based on the presentation of type functions as Markov matrices. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
• Naive adaptive behavior and the observability of gambles AI翻译
  作者：Robson, AJ
  作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
  摘要：This paper considers a class of naive adaptive learning rules in a social setting. They generalize biological selection and have become relevant in economic theory as a consequence of their use in evolutionary game models. The environment considered here is nonstrategic but includes gambles which are more or less completely observed in each period. In the long run, individuals are more averse to a gamble which is less observable, other things being equal, and may violate first-order stochastic...
• An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable AI翻译
  作者：Feinberg, Y
  作者单位：Northwestern University
  摘要：Aumann and Myerson (1988) defined a noncooperative linking game leading to the formation of cooperation structures. They asked whether it is possible for a simple game to have a stable structure in which no coalition forms, i.e., in which the cooperation graph is not internally complete but is connected and stable. We answer this question affirmatively; specifically, we present a simple proper weighted majority game with a connected incomplete structure, and we prove it to be stable under any ...
• On the state of the art in game theory: An interview with Robert Aumann AI翻译
  作者：van Damme, E; Aumann, R
• Common priors and separation of convex sets AI翻译
  作者：Samet, D
  作者单位：Tel Aviv University
  摘要：We observe that the set of all priors of an agent is the convex hull of his types. A prior common to all agents exists if the sets of the agents' priors have a point in common, We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the intersection of several closed convex subsets of the simplex, which is an extension of the separation theorem. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of common prior is a special case of this. (C) 1998 Academic Press.