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作者：Rinott, Y; Scarsini, M
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; G d'Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara
摘要：How many pure Nash equilibria can we expect to have in a finite game chosen at random? Solutions to the above problem have been proposed in some special cases. in this paper we assume independence among the profiles, but we allow either positive or negative dependence among the players' payoffs in a same profile. We provide asymptotic results for the distribution of the number of Nash equilibria when either the number of players or the number of strategies increases. We will show that differen...
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作者：Bhaskar, V
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：We analyze the symmetric equilibria of repeated symmetric games where there is a conflict of interests over equilibria-the battle-of-the-sexes or the hawk-dove game are key examples. If one restricts attention to symmetric equilibria, efficient equilibria must be egalitarian. For finitely repeated games, and generic discount factors, there is a unique outcome path which ensures efficiency within the class of symmetric equilibria. This is also true for the infinitely repeated games if the playe...
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作者：Neyman, A; Okada, D
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We investigate the asymptotic behavior of the maxmin values of repeated two-person zero-sum games with a bound on the strategic entropy of the maximizer's strategies while the other player is unrestricted. We will show that if the bound eta(n), a function of the number of repetitions n, satisfies the condition eta(n)/n --> gamma (n --> infinity), then the maxmin value W-n(eta(n)) converges to (cav U)(gamma), the concavification of the maxmin value of the stage game in which the maximizer's act...
