Branching time, perfect information games, and backward induction

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Bonanno, G
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Davis
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0812
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 57-73
• 关键词: temporal logic; branching time; prediction; internal consistency; backward induction

摘要

The logical foundations of game-theoretic solution concepts have so far been explored within the confines of epistemic logic. In this paper we turn to a different branch of modal logic, namely temporal logic, and propose to view the solution of a game as a complete prediction about future play. The branching time framework is extended by adding agents and by defining the notion of prediction. A syntactic characterization of backward induction in terms of the property of internal consistency of prediction is given. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70 C72. (C) 2001 Academic Press.