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作者：Gersovitz, M; Hammer, JS
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; The World Bank
摘要：The structure of representative agents and decentralisation of the social planner's problem provide a framework for the economics of infection and associated externalities. Optimal implementation of prevention and therapy depends on: (1) biology including whether infection is person to person or by vectors; (2) whether the infected progress to recovery and Susceptibility, immunity, or death; (3) costs of interventions; (4) whether interventions target everyone, the uninfected, the infected, or...
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作者：Lagerlöf, J
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Suppose an altruistic person, A, is willing to transfer resources to a second person, B, if B comes upon hard times. If B anticipates that A will act in this manner, B will save too little from both agents' point of view. This is the Samaritan's dilemma. This paper shows that the undersaving result is mitigated if we relax the standard assumption of complete information, because if A is uncertain about how big B's need for support is, B will have an incentive to signal that he is in great need...
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作者：Noussair, C; Robin, W; Ruffieux, B
作者单位：Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; Emory University
摘要：We elicit willingness-to-pay information for similar food products that differ only in their content of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Participants in the experiment are a demographically representative sample of French consumers. 35% of participants are unwilling to purchase products made with GMOs, 23% are indifferent or value the presence of GMOs, and 42% are willing to purchase them if they are sufficiently inexpensive. The results contrast with surveys that indicate overwhelming o...
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作者：Adam, CS; O'Connell, SA
作者单位：University of Oxford; Swarthmore College
摘要：We examine the (non) equivalence of aid and trade preferences as alternative forms of donor assistance in the presence of learning-by-doing externalities in recipient-country export production. Using a model based on van Wijnbergen (1985), we show that switching donor support on the margin from aid to trade preferences can increase recipient-country welfare. Simulations in which the productivity externality also interacts with private capital accumulation and fiscal distortions illustrate the ...
