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作者：Smorodinsky, Rann; Tennenholtz, Moshe
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper addresses the question of multi-party computation in a model with asymmetric information. Each agent has a private value (secret), but in contrast to standard models, the agent incurs a cost when retrieving the secret. There is a social choice function the agents would like to compute and implement. All agents would like to perform a joint computation, which input is their vector of secrets. However, agents would like to free-ride on others' contribution. A mechanism which elicits p...
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作者：Binmore, K; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London
摘要：Theories of focal points typically assume that games are accompanied by labelings or frames that relate the actions in the game to the environment in which the game is played. Attention then focuses on how players can exploit framing information to identify focal equilibria. This paper asks instead how evolutionary considerations determine which aspects of the environment are likely to be monitored by the players and hence appear as part of the framing information. Efficient monitoring turns o...
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作者：Montero, M
作者单位：University of Nottingham
摘要：This paper studies coalition formation, payoff division and expected payoffs in a divide the dollar by majority rule game with random proposers. A power index is called self-confirming if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game using the index itself as probability vector. Unlike the Shapley value and other commonly used power indices, the nucleolus has this property. The proof uses a weak version of Kohlberg's [SIAM J. Appl. Math. 20 (1971) 62] balancedness result reinterpreting the ...
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作者：Jullien, B.; Mariotti, T.
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：A seller possessing private information about the quality of a good attempts to sell it through a second-price auction with announced reserve price. The choice of a reserve price transmits information to the buyers. We characterize the equilibria with monotone beliefs of the resulting signaling game and show that they lead to a reduced probability of selling the good compared to the symmetric information situation. We compare the unique separating equilibrium of this signaling game to the equi...
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作者：Ockenfels, Axel; Roth, Alvin E.
作者单位：University of Cologne; Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：In second price Internet auctions with a fixed end time, such as those on eBay, many bidders submit their bids in the closing minutes or seconds of an auction. We propose an internet auction model, in which very late bids have a positive probability of not being successfully submitted, and show that late bidding in a fixed deadline auction can occur at equilibrium in auctions both with private values and with uncertain, dependent values. Late bidding may also arise Out of equilibrium, as a bes...
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作者：Lebrun, B
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：If the value cumulative distribution functions are strictly log-concave at the highest lower extremity of their supports, a simple geometric argument establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium of the first-price auction in the asymmetric independent private values model. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Noussair, C; Silver, J
作者单位：Emory University
摘要：This paper analyzes the behavior of single-unit all-pay auctions within the independent private values environment in the laboratory. We study revenue, individual bidding behavior, and efficiency, in relation to theoretical benchmarks and to a similar study of winner-pay first-price sealed-bid auctions. We conclude that the all-pay auction yields significantly higher revenue than both the risk-neutral Bayesian equilibrium and the winner-pay auction. Bidders' decisions move closer to equilibriu...
