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作者：Fehr, Ernst; Kremhelmer, Susanne; Schmidt, Klaus M.
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results cannot be explained by the self-interes...
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作者：Hoff, Karla; Stiglitz, Joseph E.
作者单位：The World Bank; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：An earlier paper showed that an economy could be trapped in an equilibrium state in which the absence of the rule of law led to asset-stripping and the prevalence of asset-stripping led to the absence of a demand for the rule of law, highlighting a coordination failure. This article looks more carefully at the dynamics of transition from a non-rule-of-law state. The article identifies a commitment problem as the critical feature inhibiting the transition: the inability, under a rule of law, to...
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作者：Cervellati, Matteo; Fortunato, Piergiuseppe; Sunde, Uwe
作者单位：University of Bologna; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：This article studies the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favourable economic institutions in the form of a state of law and absence of societal conflict arise in equilibrium. Democracies are neither necessary nor sufficient to implement a state of law, even if they may be instrumental. Efficient oligarchies can emerge and persist supported by the consensus of all groups. A taxonomy of politico-econo...
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作者：Calzada, Joan; Valletti, Tommaso M.
作者单位：University of Barcelona; Imperial College London; Sapienza University Rome
摘要：We develop a model of logit demand that extends the traditional duopoly framework of network competition to a multi-firm industry. First, we show that incumbents establish the reciprocal access charge inefficiently below cost when they compete in prices but they behave efficiently if they compete in utilities. Secondly, we study how incumbents determine the industry-wide access charge under the threat of entry. We show that incumbents may accommodate all possible entrants, only a group of them...
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作者：Paserman, M. Daniele
作者单位：Boston University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：This article estimates the degree of hyperbolic discounting in a job search model quantitatively, using data on unemployment spells and accepted wages from the NLSY. The results point to a substantial degree of hyperbolic discounting for low and medium wage workers. The structural estimates are then used to evaluate alternative policy interventions aimed at reducing unemployment. The estimated effects of a given policy can vary by up to 40%, depending on the assumed type of time discounting. S...
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作者：Shy, Oz; Stenbacka, Rune
作者单位：University of Haifa
摘要：We analyse retail industries with two-stage competition in opening hours and prices. We explore the effects of consumers' shopping time flexibility by comparing bi-directional consumers with forward- or backward-oriented consumers, who can either postpone or advance their shopping, but not both. We demonstrate that retailers with longer opening hours charge higher prices and that opening hour differentiation softens price competition. We show that competition does not create incentives for ret...
