Network competition and entry deterrence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calzada, Joan; Valletti, Tommaso M.
• 署名单位: University of Barcelona; Imperial College London; Sapienza University Rome
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02167.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1223-1244
• 关键词: sequential entry; access; telecommunications

摘要

We develop a model of logit demand that extends the traditional duopoly framework of network competition to a multi-firm industry. First, we show that incumbents establish the reciprocal access charge inefficiently below cost when they compete in prices but they behave efficiently if they compete in utilities. Secondly, we study how incumbents determine the industry-wide access charge under the threat of entry. We show that incumbents may accommodate all possible entrants, only a group of them, or may completely deter entry. When entry deterrence is the preferred option, incumbents distort the access charge upwards.