Hobbes to Rousseau: Inequality, institutions and development

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cervellati, Matteo; Fortunato, Piergiuseppe; Sunde, Uwe
• 署名单位: University of Bologna; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02173.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1354-1384
• 关键词: economic-development; industrial-revolution; DEMOCRACY; GROWTH; CONFLICT; RULE; LAW; enfranchisement; transitions; COMPETITION

摘要

This article studies the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favourable economic institutions in the form of a state of law and absence of societal conflict arise in equilibrium. Democracies are neither necessary nor sufficient to implement a state of law, even if they may be instrumental. Efficient oligarchies can emerge and persist supported by the consensus of all groups. A taxonomy of politico-economic equilibria shows the endogenous evolution of institutions depending on economic inequality and natural resource abundance, implying a non-monotonic relationship between inequality and institutional quality.