Exiting a lawless state

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hoff, Karla; Stiglitz, Joseph E.
• 署名单位: The World Bank; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02177.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1474-1497
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; private ownership; privatization; TRANSITION; FOUNDATIONS; DEMOCRACY; RULE; LAW

摘要

An earlier paper showed that an economy could be trapped in an equilibrium state in which the absence of the rule of law led to asset-stripping and the prevalence of asset-stripping led to the absence of a demand for the rule of law, highlighting a coordination failure. This article looks more carefully at the dynamics of transition from a non-rule-of-law state. The article identifies a commitment problem as the critical feature inhibiting the transition: the inability, under a rule of law, to forgive theft. This can lead to the perpetuation of the non-rule-of-law state, even when it might seem that the alternative is Pareto-improving.