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作者：Chan, William; Courty, Pascal; Hao, Li
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; European University Institute; University of Toronto
摘要：In a dynamic model of sports competition, if spectators care only about contestants' efforts, incentive schemes depending linearly on the final score difference dominate rank order schemes based only on who wins. If spectators also care about suspense, defined as valuing more contestants' efforts when the game is closer, rank order schemes can dominate linear score difference schemes, and this will be the case when the demand for suspense is sufficiently high. Under additional assumptions, we ...
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作者：O'Mahony, Mary; Timmer, Marcel P.
作者单位：University of Birmingham; University of Groningen
摘要：This article describes the contents and the construction of the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts. This database contains industry-level measures of output, inputs and productivity for 25 European countries, Japan and the US for the period from 1970 onwards. The article considers the methodology employed in constructing the database and shows how it can be useful in comparing productivity trends. Although growth accounts are the organising principle, it is argued that the database is u...
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作者：Charness, Gary; Genicot, Garance
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Georgetown University
摘要：Our laboratory study of risk sharing without commitment captures the main features of a simple model of voluntary insurance. Participants are paired in matches with stochastic endings. Each period they receive fixed endowments and one of the pair (randomly-drawn) also receives an additional amount; they can then make voluntary transfers to each other. While smoothing consumption is attractive, only self-enforcing risk sharing is possible. We find evidence supporting the theory: transfers provi...
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作者：Kotchen, Matthew J.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article examines voluntary provision of a public good that is motivated, in part, to compensate for activities that diminish the public good. Markets for environmental offsets, such as those that promote carbon neutrality, provide an increasingly salient example. An important result is that mean donations do not converge to zero as the economy grows large. The equilibrium is solved to show how direct donations and net contributions depend on wealth and heterogeneous preferences. Comparati...
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作者：Corden, W. Max
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：This article is stimulated by current criticisms of Chinese exchange rate policy. The concern is really about China's current account surplus. The article discusses the factors that determine the surplus, and the reasons why the surplus increased sharply from 2005. The international implications of China's surplus and growth are discussed, and how it has affected the world real interest rate, and through that the US current account deficit. The surplus has had various international relative pr...
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作者：Kirsanova, Tatiana; Leith, Campbell; Wren-Lewis, Simon
作者单位：University of Exeter; University of Glasgow; University of Oxford
摘要：In the last few years papers have begun to analyse optimal monetary and fiscal policy in models incorporating nominal rigidities where social welfare is derived from the utility of agents. This article examines whether this analysis provides support for the consensus assignment, where monetary policy controls demand and inflation and fiscal policy controls government debt. We argue that the basic structure of New Keynesian models implies that monetary policy dominates fiscal policy as a means ...
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作者：Janeba, Eckhard; Schjelderup, Guttorm
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：The views on the welfare effects of tax competition differ widely. Some see the fiscal externalities as the cause for underprovision of public goods, while others see tax competition as the means of reducing government inefficiencies. Using a comparative politics approach we show that tax competition among presidential-congressional democracies is typically welfare improving, while harmful among parliamentary democracies if under the latter public goods are sufficiently valued. The results hol...
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作者：Manzini, Paola; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim; Vriend, Nicolaas J.
作者单位：University of London; Otto von Guericke University
摘要：In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game', a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognised and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign of each other's trustworthiness, thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more rewarding Pareto efficient equilibrium. Our experimental res...
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作者：Chaudhuri, Ananish; Schotter, Andrew; Sopher, Barry
作者单位：University of Auckland; New York University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the 'Minimum Effort Game' which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter-generational design might enable subjects to converge to the payoff-dominant outcome. We find that coordinat...
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作者：Myatt, David P.; Wallace, Chris
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：Collective-action problems arise when private actions generate common consequences; for example, the private provision of a public good. This article asks: what shapes of public-good production function work well when play evolves over time, and hence moves between equilibria? Welfare-maximising public-good production functions yield nothing when combined efforts fall below some threshold but otherwise maximally exploit the production-possibility frontier. They generate multiple equilibria: co...
