INFORMAL RISK SHARING IN AN INFINITE-HORIZON EXPERIMENT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Charness, Gary; Genicot, Garance
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Georgetown University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02248.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 796-825
• 关键词: insurance; BEHAVIOR; RECIPROCITY; COMMITMENT; consumption; fairness; play

摘要

Our laboratory study of risk sharing without commitment captures the main features of a simple model of voluntary insurance. Participants are paired in matches with stochastic endings. Each period they receive fixed endowments and one of the pair (randomly-drawn) also receives an additional amount; they can then make voluntary transfers to each other. While smoothing consumption is attractive, only self-enforcing risk sharing is possible. We find evidence supporting the theory: transfers provide insurance to individuals, a higher match continuation probability raises transfers and more risk-averse individuals make larger transfers. More surprisingly, transfers decrease with ex ante inequality, potentially reflecting considerations of identity.