VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS FOR BADS: A THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL OFFSETS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kotchen, Matthew J.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02215.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 883-899
• 关键词: private provision; Warm-glow; Donations; MODEL

摘要

This article examines voluntary provision of a public good that is motivated, in part, to compensate for activities that diminish the public good. Markets for environmental offsets, such as those that promote carbon neutrality, provide an increasingly salient example. An important result is that mean donations do not converge to zero as the economy grows large. The equilibrium is solved to show how direct donations and net contributions depend on wealth and heterogeneous preferences. Comparative static analysis demonstrates how public good provision and social welfare depend on the technology, individual wealth and an initial level of the public good.