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作者：Bell, Brian; Van Reenen, John
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We analyse the role of financial sector workers in the huge rise of the share of earnings going to those at the very top of the pay distribution in the UK. Rising bankers' bonuses accounted for two-thirds of the increase in the share of the top 1% after 1999. Surprisingly, bankers' share of earnings showed no decline between the peak of the financial boom in 2007 and 2011, three years after the global crisis began. Nor did bankers' relative employment position deteriorate over this period. We ...
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作者：Gregory-Smith, Ian; Main, Brian G. M.; O'Reilly, Charles A., III
作者单位：University of Sheffield; University of Edinburgh; Stanford University
摘要：This article uses UK data to examine issues regarding the scarcity of women in boardroom positions. The article examines appointments, pay and any associated productivity effects deriving from increased diversity. Evidence of gender-bias in the appointment of women as non-executive directors is found together with mixed evidence of discrimination in wages or fees paid. However, the article finds no support for the argument that gender diverse boards enhance corporate performance. Proposals in ...
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作者：Conyon, Martin J.
作者单位：Lancaster University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper investigates US executive compensation and governance. I find on average executive pay is positively correlated to firm performance and firm size. Executive pay contracts contain significant equity incentives. The use of restricted stock has become more important over time. Stock options remain an important part of executive pay. Compensation committees are generally independent and there is little evidence they result in 'too high' CEO pay. The Dodd-Frank Act changed the corporate ...
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作者：Cason, Timothy N.; Mui, Vai-Lam
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Monash University
摘要：Successful deterrence of leader expropriation is important for economic development. This article studies experimentally how repeated interactions and communication can help deter leaders from extracting surplus from their subordinates. We show that repetition alone is far from sufficient in deterring leader expropriation. Communication between subordinates is critical for increasing coordinated resistance even when the information communicated is highly restrictive. Adding communication reduc...
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作者：Dewan, Torun; Humphreys, Macartan; Rubenson, Daniel
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Columbia University; Toronto Metropolitan University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
摘要：Political campaigns employ complex strategies to persuade voters to support them. We analyse the contributions of elements of these strategies using data from a field experiment that randomly assigned canvassers to districts, as well as messaging and endorsement conditions. We find evidence for a strong overall campaign effect and show effects for both message-based and endorsement-based campaigns. However, we find little evidence that canvassers varied according to their persuasive ability or...
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作者：Gregory-Smith, Ian; Thompson, Steve; Wright, Peter W.
作者单位：University of Sheffield; University of Nottingham
摘要：'Say on pay' - that is empowering shareholders to vote on the remuneration arrangements of their firm's senior executives - has become an international policy response to the perceived explosion in rewards for top management. In this study, we examine the operation of say in pay in the UK, the country which pioneered its adoption, using the population of non-investment trust companies in the FTSE 350 over the period 2003-12. We find that executive remuneration and dissent on the remuneration c...
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作者：Vicente, Pedro C.
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：Vote buying, i.e. cash for votes, happens frequently in many parts of the world. However, in the presence of secret ballots, there is no obvious way to enforce vote transactions. To infer effects of vote buying on electoral behaviour, I designed and conducted a randomised field experiment during an election in Sao Tome and Principe. I follow a voter education campaign against vote buying, using panel survey measurements as well as disaggregated electoral results. Results show that the campaign...
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作者：Barton, Jared; Castillo, Marco; Petrie, Ragan
作者单位：California State University System; California State University Channel Islands
摘要：Candidates spend considerable resources campaigning. Prior research indicates campaigning affects voting decisions but, as with advertising generally, what element of campaigning persuades - the content or its delivery method - is not fully understood. Using a field experiment in a 2010 general election for local office, we identify the mechanism behind one campaign method: candidate door-to-door canvassing. We vary both the method of contact and the information conveyed by campaign materials....
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作者：Herrera, Helios; Morelli, Massimo; Palfrey, Thomas
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Columbia University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We compare turnout under proportional power-sharing electoral systems and winner-take-all elections. The effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voter preferences. If the two parties have relatively equal support, turnout is higher in a winner-take-all system; the result is reversed when there is a clear underdog. We report findings from a laboratory experiment that was designed and conducted to explore this theoretical hypothesis and several other se...
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作者：Bryson, Alex; Forth, John; Zhou, Minghai
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Nottingham Ningbo China
摘要：Using linked employer-employee data for all China's public listed firms over the period 2001-10, we find top executive compensation exhibits many of the traits familiar in the Western literature, although sometimes in a more muted way, and with some clear exceptions. We also find a role for managerial power in executive pay setting which may reflect the recency of the stock market and regulations underpinning corporate governance. Nevertheless, there appear to be some elements of executive com...
