Coordinating Resistance Through Communication and Repeated Interaction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cason, Timothy N.; Mui, Vai-Lam
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; Monash University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12088
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: F226-F256
• 关键词: repeated play; COOPERATION; institutions; PUNISHMENT; DEMOCRACY; EVOLUTION; BEHAVIOR; dilemma; SHADOW; games

摘要

Successful deterrence of leader expropriation is important for economic development. This article studies experimentally how repeated interactions and communication can help deter leaders from extracting surplus from their subordinates. We show that repetition alone is far from sufficient in deterring leader expropriation. Communication between subordinates is critical for increasing coordinated resistance even when the information communicated is highly restrictive. Adding communication reduces expropriation significantly even in the presence of repetition.