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作者：Morton, Rebecca
作者单位：New York University
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作者：Kittel, Bernhard; Luhan, Wolfgang; Morton, Rebecca
作者单位：University of Vienna; Ruhr University Bochum; New York University
摘要：We investigate communication and costly voting in multi-party election experiments. Turnout is consistently lower across electorate communication as compared with restricted communication within parties. Voters are more likely to choose the strategic voting option at the outset in restricted communication but more likely to start deliberation by stating their first preference when unrestricted. Distributions of earnings are more inequitable when communication is restricted and the candidate pr...
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作者：Collier, Paul; Vicente, Pedro C.
作者单位：University of Oxford; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：Elections are now common in low-income societies. However, they are frequently flawed. We investigate a Nigerian election marred by violence. We designed and conducted a nationwide field experiment based on anti-violence campaigning. The campaign appealed to collective action through electoral participation, and worked through town meetings, popular theatres and door-to-door distribution of materials. We find that the campaign decreased violence perceptions and increased empowerment to counter...
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作者：Gabaix, Xavier; Landier, Augustin; Sauvagnat, Julien
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：In the 'size of stakes' view quantitatively formalised in Gabaix and Landier (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1):49-100, 2008), CEO compensation reflects the size of firms affected by talent in a competitive market. The years 2004-11 were not part of the initial study and offer a laboratory to examine the theory with new positive and negative shocks. Executive compensation (measured ex ante) did closely track the evolution of average firm value, supporting the 'size of stakes' view out of ...
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作者：Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Columbia University; University of Vienna
摘要：The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This study explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decide, competition is almost always a...
