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作者：Peters, HE; Ünür, AS; Clark, J; Schulze, WD
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Canterbury
摘要：We examine the provision of family public goods using experimental economics methods. With sufficient altruism and shared resource arrangements, families can provide the efficient level of family public goods. Becker's Rotten Kid Theorem asserts that transfers from altruistic parents will induce children to maximize family income even if children are not altruistic toward other family members. Consistent with altruism, parents and children contributed more to a public good when in groups with ...
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作者：Li, H; Suen, W
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of Toronto
摘要：In markets for entry-level professionals, the insurance motive drives some participants to sign early contracts. The rush to early contracting can be self-fulfilling, as both its effect on expectations about demand-supply balance in the subsequent spot market and the effect on it from changes in the demand-supply balance can be nonmonotone. Matching markets with more risk-averse participants, a greater uncertainty regarding relative supply of positions, or a more polarized distribution of appl...
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作者：Rota, P
作者单位：University of Brescia
摘要：We consider a dynamic model in which firms decide whether or not to vary labor in the presence of fixed costs. By exploiting the first-order condition for optimality, we derive a semireduced form in which firms' intertemporal employment is defined by a standard marginal productivity condition augmented by a forward-looking term. We obtain a marginal productivity equilibrium relation that takes into account the future alternatives of adjustment or nonadjustment that firms face. We use the struc...
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作者：Marshall, RC; Merlo, A
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University
摘要：Many unions in the United States have for several years engaged in what is known as pattern bargaining. In this article, we show that pattern bargaining is preferred by a union to both simultaneous industry-wide negotiations and sequential negotiations without a pattern. Allowing for interfirm productivity differentials within an industry, we show that for small differentials, the union most prefers a pattern in wages, but for a sufficiently wide differential, the union prefers a pattern in la...
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作者：Restuccia, D
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：I develop a growth model where a single good can be produced with a traditional and a modern technology. The traditional technology features low total factor productivity (TFP) and a low share of reproducible capital. In this framework, barriers to capital accumulation affect technology use and therefore aggregate TFP. The theory thus connects recent models of factor accumulation and of TFP. The model is calibrated by interpreting traditional production as agriculture and nonreproducible capit...
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作者：Huck, S; Normann, HT; Oechssler, J
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of London; University College London
摘要：In this article we study a very simple trial and error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to the joint-profit-maximizing outcome.
