Free-riding and the provision of public goods in the family: A laboratory experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Peters, HE; Ünür, AS; Clark, J; Schulze, WD
• 署名单位: Cornell University; University of Canterbury
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00126.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 283-299
• 关键词: inter-vivos transfers; ECONOMICS; altruism; COOPERATION; exchange; tests

摘要

We examine the provision of family public goods using experimental economics methods. With sufficient altruism and shared resource arrangements, families can provide the efficient level of family public goods. Becker's Rotten Kid Theorem asserts that transfers from altruistic parents will induce children to maximize family income even if children are not altruistic toward other family members. Consistent with altruism, parents and children contributed more to a public good when in groups with family members than when in groups with strangers. In contrast to the predictions of the Rotten Kid Theorem, however, children's behavior fell short of maximizing family income.