Through trial and error to collusion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Huck, S; Normann, HT; Oechssler, J
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00122.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 205-224
• 关键词: evolution; STABILITY

摘要

In this article we study a very simple trial and error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to the joint-profit-maximizing outcome.