Pattern bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marshall, RC; Merlo, A
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00124.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 239-255
• 关键词: dead

摘要

Many unions in the United States have for several years engaged in what is known as pattern bargaining. In this article, we show that pattern bargaining is preferred by a union to both simultaneous industry-wide negotiations and sequential negotiations without a pattern. Allowing for interfirm productivity differentials within an industry, we show that for small differentials, the union most prefers a pattern in wages, but for a sufficiently wide differential, the union prefers a pattern in labor costs. Finally, we demonstrate that pattern bargaining can be a significant entry deterrent. This provides an explanation for why incumbent firms in an industry may support the use of pattern bargaining in labor negotiations.