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作者：Kelly, Morgan
作者单位：University College Dublin
摘要：I analyze technological progress when knowledge has a large tacit component so that transmission of knowledge takes place through direct personal imitation. It is shown that the rate of technological progress depends on the number of innovators in the same knowledge network. Assuming the diffusion of knowledge to mirror the geographical pattern of trade-the greater the trade between two sites, the greater the probability that technical knowledge flows between them-I show that a gradual expansi...
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作者：Blomquist, Soren; Micheletto, Luca
作者单位：Uppsala University; University of Milan; Bocconi University
摘要：We extend to a fiscal federalism setting the literature on redistributive in-kind transfers in the presence of nonlinear income taxation. Local governments have a cost advantage, motivating decentralization of the in-kind transfer. The cost structure varies across regions, and the central government cannot observe which region is which. We show that decentralized in-kind transfers can, in this setting, be an even more important instrument for relaxing self-selection constraints, thus, helping ...
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作者：Pavoni, Nicola
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：This article introduces the possibility of a deterioration in job opportunities during unemployment into the standard optimal unemployment insurance (UI) design framework and characterizes the efficient UI scheme. The optimal program may display two novel features, which cannot be present in stationary models. First, UI transfers are bounded below by a minimal assistance level that arises endogenously in the efficient contract. Second, the optimal scheme implies a wage subsidy for long-term un...
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作者：Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos
作者单位：University of Leicester
摘要：This article considers an equilibrium search model, where firms post wages using information on workers' employment status. Earnings differentials between workers of different employment statuses are driven by firms' ability to discriminate workers' reservation wages. I study how these wage policies depend on firms' and workers' characteristics, and how these policies affect the wage distribution. The model delivers new predictions for the amount of wage dispersion that can be generated with s...
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作者：Schram, Arthur J. H. C.; Onderstal, Sander
作者单位：University of Amsterdam
摘要：We experimentally compare three mechanisms used to raise money for charities: first-price winner-pay auctions, first-price all-pay auctions, and lotteries. We stay close to the characteristics of most charity auctions by using an environment with incomplete information and independent private values. Our results support theoretical predictions by showing that the all-pay format raises substantially higher revenue than the other mechanisms.
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作者：Carceles-Poveda, Eva; Coen-Pirani, Daniele
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：When markets are incomplete, shareholders typically disagree on the firm's optimal investment plan. This article studies the shareholders' preferences with respect to the firm's investment in a model with aggregate risk, incomplete markets and heterogeneous households who trade in firms' shares instead of directly accumulating physical capital. If the production function exhibits constant returns to scale and borrowing limits are not binding, a firm's shareholders unanimously agree on its opti...
