SHAREHOLDERS' UNANIMITY WITH INCOMPLETE MARKETS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carceles-Poveda, Eva; Coen-Pirani, Daniele
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00541.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 577-606
• 关键词: business-cycle; firm; equilibrium; DYNAMICS; ECONOMY; income; RISK

摘要

When markets are incomplete, shareholders typically disagree on the firm's optimal investment plan. This article studies the shareholders' preferences with respect to the firm's investment in a model with aggregate risk, incomplete markets and heterogeneous households who trade in firms' shares instead of directly accumulating physical capital. If the production function exhibits constant returns to scale and borrowing limits are not binding, a firm's shareholders unanimously agree on its optimal level of investment. In contrast, with binding borrowing constraints, constrained shareholders prefer a higher level of investment than unconstrained ones.