BIDDING TO GIVE: AN EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF AUCTIONS FOR CHARITY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schram, Arthur J. H. C.; Onderstal, Sander
• 署名单位: University of Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00536.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 431-457
• 关键词: public-goods; bidder behavior; lotteries; 2nd-price; toeholds; field

摘要

We experimentally compare three mechanisms used to raise money for charities: first-price winner-pay auctions, first-price all-pay auctions, and lotteries. We stay close to the characteristics of most charity auctions by using an environment with incomplete information and independent private values. Our results support theoretical predictions by showing that the all-pay format raises substantially higher revenue than the other mechanisms.