OPTIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, WITH HUMAN CAPITAL DEPRECIATION, AND DURATION DEPENDENCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pavoni, Nicola
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00532.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 323-362
• 关键词: envelope theorems; DYNAMICS

摘要

This article introduces the possibility of a deterioration in job opportunities during unemployment into the standard optimal unemployment insurance (UI) design framework and characterizes the efficient UI scheme. The optimal program may display two novel features, which cannot be present in stationary models. First, UI transfers are bounded below by a minimal assistance level that arises endogenously in the efficient contract. Second, the optimal scheme implies a wage subsidy for long-term unemployed workers. Numerical simulations based on the Spanish and U.S. economies suggest that both assistance transfers and wage subsidies should be part of the UI scheme in these countries.