Evolution and information in a gift-giving game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Johnson, P; Levine, DK; Pesendorfer, W
• 署名单位: Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Princeton University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2823
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 1-21
• 关键词: evolution; INFORMATION; learning; stochastic stability; repeated games

摘要

We examine the stochastic stability of a process of learning and evolution in a gift-giving game, Overlapping generations of players are randomly matched to play the game. They may consult information systems to learn about the past behavior Of their opponents. If the value of the.-ift is smaller than twice the cost, then gifts are not given. If the value of the gift is more than four times the cost, then gifts are exchanged. Moreover, in the stochastically stable equilibrium, a unique information system is selected to support cooperation. (C) 2001 Academic Press.