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作者：Jackson, MO; Palfrey, TR
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We examine Nash implementation when individuals cannot be forced to accept the outcome of a mechanism. Two approaches are studied. The first approach is static where a state-contingent participation constraint defines an implicit mapping from rejected outcomes into outcomes that are individually rational. We call this voluntary implementation and show that the constrained Walrasian correspondence is not voluntarily implementable. The second approach is dynamic where a mechanism is replayed if ...
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作者：Hong, L; Page, SE
作者单位：Loyola University Chicago; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：A substantial amount of economic activity involves problem solving, yet economies has few, if any, formal models to address how agents of limited abilities Find good solutions to difficult problems. In this paper. we construct a model ol heterogeneous agents of bounded abilities and analyze their individual and collective performance. By heterogeneity, we mean differences in how individuals repre sent problems internally. their perspectives, and in the algorithms they use to generate solutions...
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作者：Barberà, S; Dutta, B; Sen, A
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We study the possibilities of constructing strategy-proor rules that choose sets or alternatives as a function or agents' preferences over such sets. We consider two restrictions on the domain of individual preferences over sets. Assuming that all singletons are in the range of the rule, we show that only dictatorial rules can be strategy-proof on the larger domain. The smaller domain also allows for rules,which select the set of best elements of two fixed agents. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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作者：Suzumura, K; Xu, YS
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; University of Nottingham; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：By allowing for the possibility that individuals recognize the intrinsic value of choice along with the instrumental value thereof, we suppose that individuals express extended preference orderings of the following type: Choosing an alternative x from an opportunity set A is better than choosing an alternative y from an opportunity set B. Within this framework, we identify a consequentialist and a nonconsequentialist, who show contrasting attiduces toward alternatives vis-a-vis opportunities, ...
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作者：Larson, CE; Olson, LJ; Sharma, S
作者单位：United States Department of the Treasury; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; International Monetary Fund
摘要：This paper analyzes the stochastic inventory control problem when the demand distribution is not known, In contrast to previous Bayesian inventory models, this paper adopts a nonparametric Bayesian approach in which the firm's prior information is characterized by a Dirichlet process prior. This provides considerable freedom in the specification of prior information about demand, and it permits the accommodation of fixed order costs. As information oil the demand distribution accumulates, opti...
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作者：Johnson, P; Levine, DK; Pesendorfer, W
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Princeton University
摘要：We examine the stochastic stability of a process of learning and evolution in a gift-giving game, Overlapping generations of players are randomly matched to play the game. They may consult information systems to learn about the past behavior Of their opponents. If the value of the.-ift is smaller than twice the cost, then gifts are not given. If the value of the gift is more than four times the cost, then gifts are exchanged. Moreover, in the stochastically stable equilibrium, a unique informa...
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作者：Zheng, CZ
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper analyzes auctions where budget-constrained bidders have options to declare bankruptcy. It predicts a bidding equilibrium that changes discontinuously in a borrowing rate available to bidders. When the borrowing rate is above a threshold, high-budget bidders win, and the likelihood of bankruptcy is low. When the borrowing rate is below the threshold, the winner is the most bud.-et-constrained bidder and is most likely to declare bankruptcy. This result explains the high bids and brok...
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作者：Ok, EA; Vega-Redondo, F
作者单位：New York University; Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：We study the evolution of preferences via payoff monotonic dynamics in strategic environments with and without complete information. It is known that, with complete information and subgroup matching, empirically plausible interdependent preference relations may entail the local instability of individualistic preferences (which target directly the maximization of material payoffs,fitness). In contrast, under incomplete information (unobservability of preference types). M e show that independent...
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作者：Benhabib, J; Schmitt-Grohé, S; Uribe, M
作者单位：New York University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Since John Taylor's (1993, Carnegie-Rochester Conf. Ser. Publ Policy 39, 195-214), seminal paper, a large literature has argued that active interest rate feedback rules, that is: rules that respond to increases in inflation with a more than one-for-one increase in the nominal interest rate, are stabilizing. In this paper, we argue that once the zero bound on nominal interest rates is taken into account, active interest rate feedback rules can easily lead to unexpected consequences. Specificall...
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作者：Tourky, R; Yannelis, NC
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We address a question posed by J.-F. Mertens and show that, indeed, R. J. Aumann's classical existence and equivalence theorems depend on there being many more agents than commodities. We show that for an arbitrary atomless measure space of agents there is a fixed non-separable infinite dimensional commodity space in which one can construct an economy that satisfies all the standard assumptions but which has no equilibrium, a core allocation that is not Walrasian, and a Pareto efficient alloca...
