Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levin, D; Ozdenoren, E
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.007
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 229-251
• 关键词: Auctions; uncertainty; ambiguity; number of bidders

摘要

We investigate bidders' and seller's responses to ambiguity about the number of bidders ill the first price auction (FPA) and the second price auction (SPA) with independent private valuations. We model ambiguity aversion using the maxmin expected utility model. We find that bidders prefer the number of bidders to be revealed in the FPA, are indifferent between revealing and concealing in the SPA, and prefer the SPA to the FPA. If bidders are more pessimistic than the seller then the seller prefers to conceal the number of bidders in the FPA, and prefers the FPA to the SPA. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.