Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Corominas-Bosch, M
• 署名单位: Pompeu Fabra University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00110-8
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 35-77
• 关键词: Bargaining; network market; graph theory

摘要

We analyze bargaining between buyers and sellers who are connected by an exogenously given network. Players can make repeated alternating public offers that may be accepted by any of the responders linked to each specific proposer. Our purpose is to find the conditions of the network which drive the price distribution in equilibrium. This paper uses graph theory tools to provide necessary and sufficient conditions regarding the architecture of networks for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game to coincide with the Walrasian outcome. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.