Competitive bargaining equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Davila, J.; Eeckhout, J.
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Libre de Bruxelles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.03.001
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 269-294
• 关键词: Bargaining; Walrasian equilibrium; price-setting

摘要

In a simple exchange economy we propose a bargaining procedure that leads to a Walrasian outcome as the agents become increasingly patient. The competitive outcome therefore obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other bargaining protocols the final outcome depends on bargaining power or relative impatience, the outcome here is determinate and depends only on preferences and endowments. Our bargaining procedure involves bargaining over prices and maximum quantity constraints, and it guarantees convergence to a Walrasian outcome for any standard exchange economy. In contrast, without quantity constraints we show that equilibrium is generically inefficient. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.