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作者：CASSING, JH
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作者：WOOTON, I
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作者：LAHIRI, S; RAIMONDOS, P
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School
摘要：The paper examines the effects of tied-aid on the welfare of both the donor and the recipient countries. We depart from the previous literature by assuming preexistence of quantitative trade distortions. To mitigate these distortions the donor country provides aid that is tied to the rationed good. Conditions for the presence of the transfer paradox and of the enrichment of both countries are derived and interpreted under the stability of the system. Furthermore, we show that whereas untied ai...
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作者：CORDEN, WM
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作者：ROGERS, JH; JENKINS, M
作者单位：Bangor University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We empirically assess the importance of two sources of real exchange rate movements. In models where PPP holds only among traded goods, real exchange rate variation results from relative price movements within countries. An alternative explanation relies on hysteretic price-setting and nominal exchange rate changes. Using disaggregated price data from 11 OECD nations, we find some support for the non-traded goods models. For examples, prices of haircuts in Canada and the United States are unre...
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作者：COHEN, D; VERDIER, T
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We analyze the buy-back of its debt by an LDC. Contrary to previous analyses of this subject, we assume that the debtor can hide its transactions behind the veil of a fictitious operator: the banks, we assume, cannot discriminate intra-bank transactions from buy-backs by the debtor itself. With this assumption, the lenders set the price by (rationally) taking account of the country's incentive to repurchase its debt. Will the debtor undertake a buy-back of its debt? The answer is a qualified y...
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作者：HAMADA, K
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作者：QIU, LD
摘要：This paper shows that in a duopoly model of international market competition, threatened imposition of countervailing duties by a domestic country generally deters a foreign country from subsidizing its exports to the former. To explain the coexistence of export subsidization and the GATT-conform countervailing duty measures, factors such as delay in retaliation, the GATT constraint on the amount of countervailing duties, and voluntary export restraints must be considered. We find that these f...
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作者：TESAR, LL
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作者：ANDERSON, SP; SCHMITT, N; THISSE, JF
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Simon Fraser University; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：Antidumping laws alter the pricing policies of foreign firms to the benefit of domestic ones. Unilaterally, domestic firms want to lobby for antidumping restrictions; unilaterally, consumers want to lobby against them. This paper shows that if firms succeed in both countries, their profits fall and consumer surplus rises, so that firms end up working for consumers everywhere by lobbying. It also shows that each government, maximizing total domestic surplus, prefers no legislation irrespective ...
