WHO BENEFITS FROM ANTIDUMPING LEGISLATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: ANDERSON, SP; SCHMITT, N; THISSE, JF
• 署名单位: heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Simon Fraser University; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/0022-1996(94)01347-U
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 321-337
• 关键词: antidumping law; dumping; market integration; market segmentation; Trade policy

摘要

Antidumping laws alter the pricing policies of foreign firms to the benefit of domestic ones. Unilaterally, domestic firms want to lobby for antidumping restrictions; unilaterally, consumers want to lobby against them. This paper shows that if firms succeed in both countries, their profits fall and consumer surplus rises, so that firms end up working for consumers everywhere by lobbying. It also shows that each government, maximizing total domestic surplus, prefers no legislation irrespective of the action of another government. However, world surplus may be greater with antidumping rules. These results hold under both Bertrand and Cournot competition.