SECRET BUY-BACKS OF LDC DEBT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: COHEN, D; VERDIER, T
• 署名单位: Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/0022-1996(95)01372-9
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 317-334
• 关键词: BUY-BACK; LDC DEBT

摘要

We analyze the buy-back of its debt by an LDC. Contrary to previous analyses of this subject, we assume that the debtor can hide its transactions behind the veil of a fictitious operator: the banks, we assume, cannot discriminate intra-bank transactions from buy-backs by the debtor itself. With this assumption, the lenders set the price by (rationally) taking account of the country's incentive to repurchase its debt. Will the debtor undertake a buy-back of its debt? The answer is a qualified yes. Large buy-backs will take place.