-
作者：Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Toronto
摘要：We study the effect of stochastically delayed communication on common knowledge acquisition (common learning). If messages do not report dispatch times, communication prevents common learning under general conditions even if common knowledge is acquired without communication. If messages report dispatch times, communication can destroy common learning under more restrictive conditions. The failure of common learning in the two cases is based on different infection arguments. Communication can ...
-
作者：Stauber, Ronald
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：This paper introduces a notion of robustness to ambiguous beliefs for Bayesian Nash equilibria. An equilibrium is robust if the corresponding strategies remain approximately optimal for a class of games with ambiguous beliefs that results from an appropriately defined perturbation of the belief structure of the original non-ambiguous belief game. The robustness definition is based on a novel definition of equilibrium for games with ambiguous beliefs that requires equilibrium strategies to be a...
-
作者：Velez, Rodrigo A.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We consider the problem of fairly allocating a social endowment of indivisible goods and money when the domain of admissible preferences contains, but is not restricted to, quasi-linear preferences. We analyze the manipulability of the Generalized Money Rawlsian Fair (GMRF) solutions. (i) We show that the Nash and strong Nash equilibrium correspondences of the preference revelation game form associated with each GMRF solution coincide with the no-envy solution (in equilibrium, efficiency is pr...
-
作者：Hara, Chiaki; Huang, James; Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：Kyoto University; Lancaster University; Northwestern University
摘要：We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on an individual's expected utility function under which any zero-mean idiosyncratic risk increases cautiousness (the derivative of the reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion), which is the key determinant for this individual's demand for options and portfolio insurance. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Wang, Cheng
作者单位：Iowa State University; Fudan University
摘要：In an equilibrium model of the labor market, workers and firms enter into dynamic contracts that can potentially last forever, but are subject to optimal terminations. Upon termination, the firm hires a new worker, and the worker who is terminated receives a termination contract from the firm and is then free to go back to the labor market to seek new employment opportunities and enter into new dynamic contracts. The model permits only two types of equilibrium terminations that resemble, respe...
-
作者：Chen, Yan; Soenmez, Tayfun
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Boston College
摘要：We correct an inconsistency in the efficiency comparison reported in [Y. Chen, T. Sonmez, School choice: An experimental study, J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]. The efficiency comparison of the three school choice mechanisms in our paper is based on recombinant estimation with an identical set of 10 tie-breakers, while the statistics reported in Table 7 is computed using 14,400 tie-breakers. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Georganas, Sotiris; Kagel, John
作者单位：University of London; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study auctions with resale based on Hafalir and Krishna's (2008) [6] model. As predicted, weak bidders bid more with resale than without, so that average auction prices tend to increase. When the equilibrium. calls for weak types to bid higher than their values with resale they do, but not nearly as much as the theory predicts. In other treatments outcomes are much closer to the risk neutral Nash model's predictions. Bid distributions for weak and strong types are more similar with resale t...
