Asymmetric auctions with resale: An experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Georganas, Sotiris; Kagel, John
• 署名单位: University of London; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.001
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 359-371
• 关键词: Auctions; resale; experiment

摘要

We study auctions with resale based on Hafalir and Krishna's (2008) [6] model. As predicted, weak bidders bid more with resale than without, so that average auction prices tend to increase. When the equilibrium. calls for weak types to bid higher than their values with resale they do, but not nearly as much as the theory predicts. In other treatments outcomes are much closer to the risk neutral Nash model's predictions. Bid distributions for weak and strong types are more similar with resale than without, in line with the theory. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.