Minimal stable sets in tournaments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brandt, Felix
• 署名单位: Technical University of Munich
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.004
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1481-1499
• 关键词: Tournament solutions; Stable sets; Social choice theory; game theory

摘要

We propose a systematic methodology for defining tournament solutions as extensions of maximality. The central concepts of this methodology are maximal qualified subsets and minimal stable sets. We thus obtain an infinite hierarchy of tournament solutions, encompassing the top cycle, the uncovered set, the Banks set, the minimal covering set, and the tournament equilibrium set. Moreover, the hierarchy includes a new tournament solution, the minimal extending set, which is conjectured to refine both the minimal covering set and the Banks set. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.