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作者：Bac, M; Raff, H
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We present a model of tariff disputes and concessions consisting of an infinitely repeated game under bilateral incomplete information. Given potential agreements to be reached through unilateral or reciprocal concessions, we find that an agreement involving reciprocal concessions is reached immediately if the discount factor is large and/or the volume of trade is small. Otherwise prior beliefs about country type matter: when both countries hold pessimistic priors, immediate reciprocal concess...
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作者：Goldberg, LS; Karimov, I
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
摘要：In emerging market economies, under-development of financial markets leads to goods hoarding and foreign currency accumulation as forms of investment. In this paper an asset market model, supplemented by explicit treatment of smuggling and second-economy activity, is used to study the paths of black-market exchange rates, second-economy prices, hoarding stocks, and privately held dollar balances following policy reforms. We discuss conditions for overshooting and related dynamics of exchange r...
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作者：Ishikawa, J; Lee, KD
作者单位：Keimyung University
摘要：This paper examines the effects on the domestic economy of domestic tariffs imposed on an intermediate good or a final good in vertically related markets which are characterized by Cournot oligopolies. Tariffs could lead a foreign firm to enter or exit from the domestic final-good market. Some of our results are counter-intuitive. It is particularly shown that tariffs on the intermediate good which induce the entry could harm domestic intermediate-good producers and/or benefit domestic final-g...
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作者：Brainard, SL; Martimort, D
作者单位：INRAE; Harvard University
摘要：We investigate the implications of incomplete information for a simple, rent-shifting trade policy a la Brander and Spencer (Journal of International Economics, 1985, 18, 83-100). Asymmetric information undermines the precommitment effect of unilateral government intervention, due to the requirements of incentive compatibility. This 'screening' effect induces a downward distortion in the optimal subsidy, which may require a tax rather than a subsidy for the least efficient firms. The introduct...
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作者：Cartiglia, F
摘要：This paper analyzes the implications of capital market imperfections for understanding the causes and consequences of international trade. Credit constraints in financing education and exogenous income distribution affect patterns of comparative advantage and are crucial in determining the impact of international trade. Unlike the standard results in the trade literature, in the model here, trade liberalization in a skill-scarce country leads to higher investments in human capital.
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作者：Morton, JE
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作者：Spencer, BJ
摘要：Despite valid criticisms, many developing countries have issued non-transferable import licenses to a limited number of final-good producers so as to restrict imports of an input, such as capital equipment. This paper demonstrates that for a given import quota, such licensing restrictions can actually increase domestic production of both the input and the final product, but at the cost of reduced quota rents. Under pure competition, domestic welfare falls relative to the use of marketable quot...
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作者：Bandyopadhyay, S
摘要：This paper shows that demand elasticities and cost asymmetry are important determinants of strategic trade policy. In the symmetric case, the direction of intervention is critically dependent upon the elasticity of demand. Under unit elastic demand, free trade is optimal under symmetry, and a subsidy (tax) is optimal if the exporting firm has lower (higher) marginal cost than its competitor. If both the exporting governments intervene, then the conventional result that the lower cost firm gets...
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作者：Dinopoulos, E; Syropoulos, C
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida International University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：The paper develops a dynamic multi-country, multi-commodity model of Schumpeterian growth, trade, and tariffs. The presence of a nontraded final good sector generates differences in long-run growth across countries. Furthermore, if the growth intensity of the nontraded good is lower than the growth intensity of traded goods, then the liberalization of trade raises the long-run growth of all trading partners. The paper also analyzes the implications of multilateral, bilateral and unilateral sch...
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作者：Lovely, ME
摘要：In a small, open economy characterized by an increasing-returns sector and foreign-owned capital, a sector-specific instrument generally is needed to achieve the optimum. A capital subsidy alone can be used for decentralization, however, when the optimal production plan is specialization in the externality-generating activity. The effect of a capital subsidy on home income and its distribution depends on the pattern of production and the share of domestic capital that is foreign owned. In a di...
