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作者：Daniel, BC
摘要：The neoclassical representative agent model attributes persistent current account imbalance to differences in time preference rates. Exogenous time preference yields corner solutions in which one country owns the world's wealth. With endogenous time preference, corners are avoided, but at the cost of the intuitively unappealing assumption that wealthier agents are more impatient. This paper shows that an agent, with constant relative risk aversion utility, subject to stochastic income shocks, ...
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作者：Huizinga, H; Nielsen, SB
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; Tilburg University
摘要：This paper establishes optimal rules for capital income and profits taxation in the open economy with or without foreign ownership of domestic firms. We show that if there are constraints on the feasibility of profits taxation, both saving and investment taxes generally enter the optimal tax package. If instead profits can be fully taxed, then source-based investment taxes vanish. If domestic firms are in part owned by foreigners, then source-based investment taxes can be used to shift income ...
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作者：Puga, D; Venables, AJ
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper considers the locational effects of geographically discriminatory trade policy. A preferential move towards a free trade area pulls industry into the integrating countries. Input-output links between imperfectly competitive firms amplify this effect and, when trade barriers fall below some critical level, may lead to agglomeration with some member countries gaining industry at the expense of others. A hub-and-spoke arrangement favours location in the hub, with better reciprocal acce...
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作者：Das, SP
摘要：This paper examines the implications of delegation of quantity or price setting power to the managers by the firm owners, for trade policy. Delegation reduces the scale of strategic trade policy in an exporting industry. In an import-competing oligopoly industry, the optimal tariff is less or greater than the standard optimal tariff depending on whether firms compete in quantity or price. A quantitative import restriction is collusive even when firms compete in quantities, and induces the home...
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作者：Bartolini, L; Drazen, A
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We present a model where policies of free capital mobility can signal governments' future policies, but the informativeness of the signal depends on the path of world interest rates. Capital flows to emerging markets reflect investors' perception of these markets' political risk. With low world interest rates, emerging markets experience a capital inflow and engage in a widespread policy of free capital mobility; with higher rates, only sufficiently committed countries allow free capital mobil...
