Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brainard, SL; Martimort, D
• 署名单位: INRAE; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(96)01446-8
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 33-65
• 关键词: strategic trade policy; asymmetric information

摘要

We investigate the implications of incomplete information for a simple, rent-shifting trade policy a la Brander and Spencer (Journal of International Economics, 1985, 18, 83-100). Asymmetric information undermines the precommitment effect of unilateral government intervention, due to the requirements of incentive compatibility. This 'screening' effect induces a downward distortion in the optimal subsidy, which may require a tax rather than a subsidy for the least efficient firms. The introduction of a rival interventionist government countervails the screening effect. Finally, we introduce a nonintervention-profit participation constraint. In this case, the government targets the efficient firms with positive subsidies, and eschews intervention for the least efficient firms. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science B.V.