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作者：SANDER, W
摘要：This study examines educational outcomes in Illinois for the 1989-1990 school year. Several measures of educational attainment are analyzed including ACT scores, high school graduation rates, and the percentage in a high school planning to attend college. The most important results are that an increase in average teacher's salary increases ACT scores and the percentage college-bound rand an increase in the pupil-teacher ratio reduces the graduation rate and the percentage college-bound.
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作者：SILVA, ECD; KAHN, CM
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：This paper examines the problem of costly exclusion of individuals from a public good. Previous analyses of exclusion have treated it as solely a question of technologies; in our analysis exclusion depends on technology and incentives. In this paper providers of the good design a mechanism to provide an optimal level of deterrence to free riders. If individuals are heterogeneous optimal deterrence may allow some free riders. We examine the effect of costs of exclusion on the Samuelson conditio...
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作者：MCKEE, M; WINTROBE, R
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：Parkinson reported observing substantial growth of administrators as organizations were declining. Such behavior has usually been considered proof of an inherent tendency for bureacracies to grow. In this paper we offer a different interpretation: expansion of administration during periods of decline is the result of promotions of line workers to administrative positions. Promotions are a means of protecting from layoff or dismissal those employees who have accumulated network capital with the...
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作者：LEVINSOHN, J; SLEMROD, J
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In this paper we develop some simple models of optimal tax and tariff policy in the presence of global corporations that operate in an imperfectly competitive environment. The models emphasize two important differences in the practical application of tax and tariff policy - tax, but not tariff, policy can apply to offshore output, and tariff, but not tax, policy can be industry-specific. Recognizing that multinationals' production decisions are endogenous to the tax and tariff policies they fa...
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作者：MARCHAND, M
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作者：LEWBEL, A
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作者：MICHAEL, MS; HATZIPANAYOTOU, P; MILLER, SM
作者单位：University of Connecticut
摘要：The literatures on tariffs and commodity taxes have independently established sufficient conditions under which a tariff or commodity tax reform improves welfare. The present paper considers policy reforms within an integrated indirect tax structure. Given the relative inefficiency of tariffs to consumption taxes, given the existing high tariffs in less-developed countries (LDCs), and given the LDCs' need to raise certain revenue from indirect taxation, we identify conditions under which decre...
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作者：KIANDER, J
摘要：The aim of the paper is to derive an optimal unemployment insurance policy for a utilitarian trade union when job search matters. It is shown that the well-known result from the theory of insurance concerning the optimal risk sharing between risk averse agents changes essentially, if the search behavior is allowed to affect the performance of the labor market. We assume that labor market mismatch decreases with search effort, which in turn decreases with the benefit. The resulting equilibrium ...
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作者：FORTIN, B; TRUCHON, M; BEAUSEJOUR, L
摘要：Using a simulation model for a small open economy (Quebec 1986), various Negative Income Tax (NIT) and workfare schemes are compared from the point of view of efficiency and equity. The main finding is that there exist workfare schemes that are superior both to the Quebec regime of 1986, and to a NIT characterized by a 100 percent implicit tax rate. However, these workfare schemes are dominated by some NIT programs. This suggests that it may be necessary to have work requirements that vary acr...
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作者：DEFRAJA, G
摘要：This paper compares the degree of X-inefficiency which emerges as a consequence of the imposition of the optimal incentive contracts in public and private firms. Using a straightforward principal-agent model, with two possible states of the world, it establishes the rather surprising result that, in the good state of the world, public ownership always results in a higher degree of productive efficiency.
