THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZATIONS AND THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATORS - PARKINSON LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
MCKEE, M; WINTROBE, R
署名单位：
Western University (University of Western Ontario)
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(93)90068-5
发表日期：
1993
页码：
309-327
关键词：
摘要：
Parkinson reported observing substantial growth of administrators as organizations were declining. Such behavior has usually been considered proof of an inherent tendency for bureacracies to grow. In this paper we offer a different interpretation: expansion of administration during periods of decline is the result of promotions of line workers to administrative positions. Promotions are a means of protecting from layoff or dismissal those employees who have accumulated network capital with their superiors. All large organizations (private firms as well as public bureaus) can be expected to behave in this way and Parkinson's observations are simply evidence of the existence of implicit contracts within organizations. We report empirical tests which provide convincing evidence for Parkinson's Law in two very different organizations - a public sector bureau (education) and a private sector industry (steel).
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